Progress of the Law by Editors,
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ASSIGNMENT.
The question as to how far it is a fraud upon creditors,
having a' priority but staying proceedings at the request of
the debtor, to make an assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors, ivas discussed by the New York
Supreme Court in Bank v. Wheel Co., 73 N. Y. Supp. 114.
There the creditor was on the point of securing judgment
upon a note, but granted an extension upon the debtor's
promise to secure him in his priority; and the court held
that the assignment, under those conditions, was fraudulent.
McLennan, J. dissented on the ground that the defendants
had only done their duty after insolvency.
BANKRUPTCY.
The constitution of the St. Louis Stock Exchange pro-
vides that if a member is expelled, his seat shall be disposed
Membership of by the Committee on Admission. Nothing
In Stock is said as to forfeiture, although in other con-
Excge, tingencies. such as death, the proceeds are to
Expulsion be applied to the payment of debts, and the resi-
due is to be handed over to the estate. The court in In re
Gaylord, iii Fed. R. 717, held the seat of an expelled
member was an asset in the hands of .the trustee. This ap-
pears to be contrary to Belton v. Hatch, lO9 N. Y. 593-
It was held by Lowell, J. in In re Coller, i i i Fed. R. 503,
that where a person needed a watch to keep an account of
Watcha his time at w€ork, while away from the factory,
Impiement his watch was- exempt; but that he *was only
of Trade entitled to a watch that will answer his purpose;
and he directed that the trustee might take the bankrupt's
watch provided -he gave him $Io to buy another.
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CARRERS.
In the case of Ullman v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co.; 88 N. W.
41, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that where a
Umiting carrier has printed in its bill of lading a clause
Liability, stating that its liability shall be limited to the
Valuation of valuation declared by the shipper and shall in
Shipment no event exceed a certain figure, such a contract
is not an arbitrary stipulation against liability for negli-
gence, but a valuation agreed upon between the shipper and
the carrier. The court agrees that no common carrier can
by contract free itself from all liability. The leading case
upon this point is Hart v. R. R. Co., 121 U. S. 351. The
decision in this case is contrary to that in R. R. v. Owens,
(Ky.) 19 S. W. 59c.
During the summer of i9oi, the D. L. & W. R. Co. sold
tickets to the Pan-American Exposition at a special rate,
Sca in consideration of the purchaser agreeing not
Tickets, to transfer it. In R. R. v. Frank, Iio Fed. 689,
Tanster the railroad company sought to enjoin the de-
Prohibited fendants who were ticket-scalpers from hand-
ling the tickets. The defence was that the plaintiff could
not deprive a purchaser of his property in the ticket, which
included the right to sell, but Hazen, J. held that an injunc-
tion would lie. However, as the plaintiff was a party to a
pooling combination in violation- of the Anti-Trust Law,
it was held not to be entitled to any equitable relief. For
a discussion of the question of a railroad's duty to a trans-
feree of a special ticket, see Mosher v. Rwy. Co, 127 U. S.
390.
A. purchased tickets, good for passage, berths and meals
upon a steamship of the B. Co., for himself and family.
Insuficient When he came aboard he -found the boat
Accommoda.- crowded, and was unable to secure berths. The
tions, Action officials at last arranged to furnish his wife with
for Death
a berth, provided he would sleep upon a mat-
tress. During the night he contracted a severe cold, which
developed into pneumonia, causing his death. In Van Anda
v. Navigation Co., i i i Fed. R. 765, the widow was refused
any recovery for his death and the company exonerated be-
cause of the large number of travelers at that season of the
year.
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CONDITIONAL4 SALE.
In the case of In re Sewell, III Fed. R. 791, the A. Co.
had sold a cash register to B. under an agreement whereby
Bankruptcy, the title remained in the A. Co. until final pay-
Validity of ment. This amounts, under the Kentucky law,
Lien to a chattel mortgage, which, while unrecorded,
creates no lien as against a subsequent creditor, but is valid
as to antecedent creditors. Where B. had gone into bank-
ruptcy, the court held that the A. Co.'s lien was not dis-
charged, although the creditors .were all subsequent credit-
ors; for, as the court says, the transfer of the property to
the trustee is for the benefit of all creditors; and if there
were antecedent creditors, as they could not take, so neither
could the subsequent creditors. The court refuses to make
any distinction, because in this case there happen to be no
antecedent creditors.
CONSPIRACY.
The plaintiff in Baker v. Sun Ins. Co., 64 S. W. 967, at-
tempted to recover damages for the unlawful act of the de-
Prouring fendant in securing his discharge by a third
Another's company. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
Dischargo adopted the rule laid down in Bourlier v. Mac-
auley, 91 Ky. 135, that a party to a contract cannot main-
tain an action against a person who has maliciously advised
and procured another party to break it, unless the party pro-
curing the breaking of the contract did so by coercion or
deception, and thus caused the party to break the contract
against his will or contrary to his purpose.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The statute passed by the Kansas Legislature, March
3, 1897, declares that all stockyards receiving more than
Limiting one hundred head of cattle per day, shall be pub-
Charges by lic stockyards; and then proceeds to lay down a
Stockyards - maximum rate to be charged by public stock-
yard owners for keeping cattle. The stockyards at Kan-
sas City are the only ones doing sufficient business to
come under this classification. In Cutting v. 'Goddard,
22 Sup. Ct. R. 30, the U. S. Supreme Court decided that
there was no good basis for the classification here-that
success in building up a large business should not make a.
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company a "legitimate object of the legislative scalping
knife." The court accordingly held it in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, guaranteeing
the equal protection of the laws.
The Legislature of Kentucky has passed a statute, im-
posing a penalty upon any common carrier charging more
Carriers, for a short than a long haul, by which the rail-
Long and road commission hears all complaints and alone
Short Haul has the right to present an information to the
grand jury, it being in the power of the commission to
exonerate. In Ill. C. R. R, v. Common., 64 S. W.
975, this statute was attacked as a violation of the clause in
the Federal Constitution, securing to every citizen due pro-
cess of law. But the court holds that this provision does
not extend to matters which at common law were not of
judicial cognizance so as to require them to be tried now by
the courts. Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 2o1. Three
judges dissent.
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
In the case of Conkey v. Russell, et al., iii Fed. R. 417,
the U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, had
Conspi presented to it the question whether it could
to Defeat punish, for contempt of its injunction, a party
Injuncti n who had not been .a defendant to the bill,
but had with actual knowledge of the court's decree
conspired to defeat it. The court had enjoined striking
typesetters from interfering with workmen in the employ
of the Conkey Co.; and the party, cited for contempt, had
been sent to the factory by a Chicago Union to carry on the
intimidation. He was guilty of contempt. There was the
further objection made that he was a resident of the same
state as the plaintiff and, therefore, the Circuit Court had
no jurisdiction. The court overruled it upon the authority
of In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548.
CONTRACTS.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals had the following state
of facts to deal with in R. R. v. Coal Co., 64 S. W. 969.
Ralh..ad, The railroad had a switch running along an
Exclusive Use unopened street, and, at one point, going over
of Switch the land of B. The latter granted the right of
way upon condition that the railroad company would
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not haul coal from any other coal company over that
switch. The court held that this was granting a monopoly
to B.-:-that since the railroad company could condemn the
right of way, it had no right to enter into such a contract
for it-and gave the plaintiff, below, a mandatory injunc-
tion compelling the defendant to furnish cars. The court
relies upon Hays v. Pennsylvania Co., 12 Fed. 309.
The question arose, in the case of Smith v. Stanchfield,
87 N. W. 917, as to what kind of a promise was sufficient to
Discharge In revive a debt that had been discharged in bank-
Bankruptcy, ruptcy. The action was upon a promissory note
Revlval given prior to the bankruptcy, and which it was
of D, bt alleged the defendant had since verbally agreed
to pay. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that an
oral promise was all that was necessary to revive the debt;
but the defendant was given judgment on account of the
insufficiency of the evidence. This case agrees with Elwell
v. Cumner, 136 Mass. 102.
CORPORATIONS.
The A. Co. had four unsecured creditors. It having be-
come embarrassed, three of these creditors, through an agree-
Insolvency, ment with the holders of the common stock of
Right to the A. Co. secured the election of directors,
Prefer favorable to their interests. The business was
Directors continued for several years, without any objec-
tion upon the part of the other unsecured creditor. Dur-
ing this time, the three creditors in control made further
advances to tide the company over; but finally-the com-
pany's condition becoming hopeless-their representatives
upon the board of directors executed a deed of trust with
a preference for the three creditors. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Amer. Exchange Bank v. Ward, I I I Fed. 782,
held these preferences valid, although they were treated as
preferences made by the directors in their own favor, in
the absence of any evidence to show that the beneficiaries'
claims were not bona fide.* The court rejects the idea that
the assets of the company become a trust fund upon its in-
solvency, and the hard point in the case was as to preference
by directors in their own favor. They decide that such a
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preference is good, in the absence of fraud, whether the
debt be present or precedent. An instructive'.discussion
of this question is to be found in Sanford Tool Co. v. Howe,
157 U. S. 312.
A very interesting case of "freezing out" minority stock-
holders is shown in Mumford v. Ecuador Development
Rights of Co., i 11 Fed. R. 639, where the majority stock-
Minority holders of a prosperous corporation transferred
Stockholders their stock to a third company and the latter
proceeded to vote to itself, thrQugh the directors it elected,
all the former corporation's valuable contracts and assets.
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York
held these facts warranted equitable relief in favor of the
minority stockholders. See the case of Menier v. Telegraph
Works, 9 Chanc. App. 350.
The president of a Delaware corporation was indicted
in a New York Court for perjury in swearing to the certifi-
certifcate, cate of incorporation; and, to refresh a witness'
Takingout memory, application was made to the Secretary
of tte of State of Delaware to allow the original cer-
tificate to be taken to New York. The Delaware Court of
Chancery enjoined the Secretary in the case of Delaware
Surety Co. v. Layton, 50 Atl. R. '378, from acceding to the
application.
The plaintiff in Hallenberg v. Green, 73 N. Y. Supp. 406,
petitioned for a receiver of an Arizona corporation on the
jurudiction, ground of fraud. The Supreme Court refused
Appointment the application bedause they had no control in
of Receiver such a matter over a foreign corporation. This
is in accord with Madden v. Electric Co., ig Pa. 454
(19Ol). The court did, nevertheless, de'cide that it had
jurisdiction over a fund, belonging to the corporation and
deposited with a trust company within the State of New
York. The -ourt held their had power to appoint a receiver;
that the fund Would not pass into the hands of the receiver
appointed by the Arizona Court; and that the New York
receiver would only be bound to pay it over when the
Arizona court had made final distribution of the company's
assets. Van Brunt, P. J. dissents.
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A partnership was heavily indebted to a corporation,
and the only chance the creditor had to be paid was in case
Ultra Vires, the debtor could continue in business. To
Pledge of that end, the corporation became surety upon a
Credit promissory note, but it now seeks to avoid its
liability upon the ground that such pledge of credit was
ultra vires. The New York Supreme Court in Heas v.
Sloane, 73 N. Y. Supp. 313, held this act was among the
implied powers of the corporation. They rely upon Koehler
v. Reinheimer, 26 App. Div. I. One judge dissents.
DAUtAGES.
Where cabbage seed had been sold and turned otit
worthless, the following rule, for ascertaining the damages,
seeds.. was laid down by the New York Supreme Court
Implied in Landreth v. Wyckoff, 73 N. Y. Supp. 388i
Warranty "the value of a crop, such as the jury should
believe would ordinarily have been produced that year, de-
ducting all expenses of raising the crop, and also deduct-
ing the value of the crop actually raised." The other view
of this question is taken in Ferris v. Comstock, 33 Conn.
513, where the expected profits were held to be too specula-
tive and the plaintiff was limited to the cost of the seed and
the labor in cultivating it, less the benefit done to the ground
by the crop.
EJECTMENT.
The Supreme Court of New York, in which state a mort-
gage is regarded as a lien, conferring no legal title upon
Landlord, the holder, dealt with an interesting point upon
Mortgagee in that subject in Barson v. Mulligan, 73 N. Y.
Possession Supp. 262. The defendant was lessee under
a life tenant, whose term had expired, and also holder of a
first mortgage upon the leased premises. The plaintiffs
had leased the disputed property to a third party and, dur-
ing the continuance of this lease, brought ejectment. The
court unanimously held that this lease did not bar the plain-
tiff's action.of ejectment; but, upon the point of the rights
of a mortgagee in possession, the court disagreed-the ma-
jority holding that while a mortgagee out of possession can-
not maintain ejectment, one lawfully in possession can de-
fend in such a suit. They rely upon Madison Ave. Church
v. Oliver St. Church, 73 N. Y. 94.
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EMINENT° DOMAIN.
The legislature of Minnesota, in a statute, providing for
the establishment of a uniform height at which w-Aers in
Constitutional navigable lakes should'be maintained, gve the
Law, district courts the power, after hearing 'he facts
Legislative in the case, to condemn the lands necessary for
Power. the erection of proper dams. This act's validity
was assailed upon the ground that the legislature had at-
tempted to delegate an exclusively legislative function to
the district court; but the court upheld the statute, in Mc-
Gee v. Board of Commiss., 88 N. W. 6.
1QUITABLU ASSIGNMENT.
The question of what constitutes an equitable assignment
is considered by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Phillips
Attorney's v. Hogue, 88 N. W. i8o, and they refuse to
Fees recognize the lien of an attorney where his
client had, by a verbal promise, agreed to pay him out of a
certain fund. The case is in accord with the decision in
Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 69.
EVIDENCE.
In the case of Vaughan v. Mason, 5o At. R. 390, the de-
fendant set up, as a defence to an action for damages, a
Release parol receipt which stated that the amount re-
Receipt ceived was in full settlement. The plaintiff
offered parol evidence to vary the writing, and his offer was
accepted-; but the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, while
admitting that a simple receipt could be varied by parol,
held that here there was an agreement between the two
parties. The lower court was, therefore, reversed. Squires
v. Amherst, 145 Mass. 192, supports this decision.
In Peo. v. Henry (Mich.), 88 N. W. 77, the defendant had
been indicted for breaking into a saloon with intent to com-
Criminal mit larceny. The breaking was admitted, but
Law, the defence was made that the prisoner was
Evidence of intoxicated and had no felonious intent. The
Other Crimes trial court admitted evidence of two fbrmer
convictions of larceny, for the purpose, of showing the in-
tent. This was held error, because, in this case, intent was
the gist of the crime; and to admit the evidence offered,
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would be to prove the commission of one crime from evi-
dence of other crimes. The court cites Swan v. Com., i04
Pa. 218, but the facts are not parallel.
INANTS.
In Lowery v. Cate, 64 S. W. io68, the action was one in
tort against a minor for so negligently operating an engine,
UabIlIty for that wheat belonging to the plaintiffs was set
C ntract afire and burnt. The plaintiffs had contracted
with the defendant to thresh their wheat; and the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held that while this was technically
tort it was really an action for the negligent performance
of a contract upon which the defendant was not liable.
The next friend of several infants employed an attorney
to secure a decree for the sale of some lands belonging tW
5ale of and inherited by the infants. After the sale had
Land, been ratified it was discovered that the dece-
Attorney's dent's personalty was insufficient to pay his
Compensation debts, and the creditors were paid out of the
proceeds of the sale-making the proceeding a creditor's
suit rather than a partition sale. From the surplus, the at-
torney's fee was paid, but the auditor disallowed the credit.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Senseney v. Repp, 50
Atl. R. 416, reversed the order, on the ground that the
attorney had rendered services to the infants, and if unpaid
out of the fund, would not be compensated at all.
INNKXZPE R.
The New Jersey Court of Appeals deals with an interest-
ing question regarding the liability of innkeepers in Livery
LtabIlity, Co. v. Snook, 5o Atl. R. 358. The defendant
care of Horses had an open shed for the accommodation of
guests' teams. The plaintiff's servant tied his team, with-
out specifically calling the defendant's attention to the fact
or placing them in the custody of a hostler. As they were
stolen, the plaintiff attempted to hold the innkeeper; but the
court affirmed the non-suit because there was no sufficient
placing in the innkeeper's custody. Magie, Ch. dissents.
The court distinguishes the case from Mason v. Thompson,
9 Pick. (Mass.) 280.
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INSANITY.
In State v. nigl ht, 50 Atl. R. 276, there was an attempt
to have the Supreme Court of Maine break away from the
M1urder. rule for legal insanity as laid (]own in 3Jc'Nagh-
Uncontrollable ten's Case, io Cl. & F. 200, and add to the test
Impulse of whether, the accused could distinguish be-
tween right and wrong the further question as to whether
he could choose the right. The court refused to break away
from the settled doctrine on the ground that it has proved
adequate and satisfactory. Parsons v. State, 8i Ala. 577,
is one of the few cases accepting irresistible impulse as a
defence.
INSURANCE.
In Miller v. Ins. Co., i i I Fed. R. 465, Boyd, J., held a
local agent's representation that an applicant was insured
Life Insurance after paying the first premium, even before the
acceptance of the application by the company,
was not binding upon the defendant. Here the application
stated that none of the agent's statements would bind the
company unless reduced to writing and accepted by the com-
pany.
A company issued a policy to their medical examiner,
who had agreed with their agent that the latter should pay
Payment of the first premium and reimburse himself from
Premium the fees due the doctor. When the medical
examiner died, no premium had been paid, and the New
York Supreme Court, in Hewitt v. Ills Co., 73 N. Y. Supp.
lO5, held that the widow could not recover, as there was
no evidence of any extension of time for payment of the
premium or that the agent made the promise as the agent of
the company.
Exactly what contingencies are covered by a policy agree-
ing to insure "against liability to employes of the insured
E-ployer's for accidents," was raised in Cornell v. Travelers'
Indemnity Ils. CO., 73 N. Y. Supp. 341. The plaintiff was
erecting structural steel in a new building, when a fall of the
girders-due to no fault of his-killed some workmen. Be-
ing sued, he called upon the insurance company to defend,
which they refused to do. He thereupon successfully de-
fended; and now seeks to recover the costs of his suit. The
court holds that the policy was to indemnify the plaintiff
PROGRESS OF THE-LAW.
INSURANCE (Continued).-
against any expenses'which he might sustain by reason of
such claims being made. This would lay a heavy burden
'upon the insurer. It is, however, in accord with Hoven v.
Assurance. Corp., 93 Wis. 201. The opinion is dissented
from by Ingraham, J.
'MORTGAGES.
'A. purchased property and gave his bond- and mortgage
to secure the purchase price. Later, selling to B., A. takes
Assumption an agreement from B. to assume the obligation,
by Grantee, but this agreement did not appear in the deed.
Principal A subsequent holder executes a second mort-
Surety 'gage. The first mortgagee securing judgment
against A. in an action to foreclose, the holder of the second
mortgage pays the judgment and has it assigned to him.
He now proceeds to apply the profits of the land' to the
satisfaction of the second lien-still claiming the right to
hold A. for any deficiency in the value of the land. A. con-
tends that B. is ttie principal debtor upon the bond, and he,
himself, is a surety and as such may pay the debt and take
the creditor's security-the first mortgage. The New York
Supreme Court in Howard v. Robbins, 73 N. Y. Supp. 172,
takes the view of the original mortgagor, A., although Mc-
Lennan and Adams, JJ., dissent upon the ground that A.
was the principal debtor.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
There is in the Iowa Constitution a provision that no
municipality shall be allowed to contract debts beyond a
Limitation of certain limit in any manner or for any' purpose.
Indebtedness There was a gross over-issue by a school dis-
trict and the plaintiffs tried to evade the provision -of the
Constitution on the ground that the bonds, upon their face,
recited they were not issued in contravention of that provis-
ion. Shiras, J., in Fairfield v. School Dist., III Fed. R.
453 (N. D. Iowa), held the issue was void-that regardless
of recitals, the purchaser was bound to take notice of the
actual facts. The case is distinguished from Gunnison v.
Rollins, 173 U. S. 255, on the ground of the peculiar word-
ing of the Colorado statute in that case.
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The plaintiff in Bell v. City of New York, 73 N. Y. Supp.
298, had purchased a piece of ground at a tax sale, under
Tax Sals an act providing that such sale should be a bar
Prior to all persons interested in the land. It was
Assessments held that this did not discharge the lien against
the land of unpaid assessments for local improvements.
NATIONAL BANKS.
According to the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit, in McKnight v. U. S., I I I Fed. R. 735, where
Embezzle- a national bank officer is indicted for embezzle-
ment, Intent ment under § 5209 of the Revised Statutes, the
as Element prosecution must prove that the offence was com-
mitted with intent to defraud the bank. Although the indict-
ment made these averments, yet as the judge had refused to
charge that the prisoner could not be convicted unless the
fraudulent intent against the bank were found, the case
was reversed. This decision is rested upon U. S. v. Britton,
1O7 U. S. 65 5.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in
the case of Strickland v. Henry, 73 N. Y. Supp. 12, holds
Accommoda. that any person discounting an accommodation
tlon Paper, note and reserving more than the legal interest
usurious will be guilty of usury. They treat the trans-
Discount action as a loan and not a sale. The authorities
on this point are discussed in Cla/in v. Boorumr, 122 N. Y.
385.
QUIETING TITLE.
In Batty v. Hastings, 88 N. W. 139, the question arose as
to when an action to remove cloud upon title would be
Limitations barred; and the Supreme Court of Nebraska
decided that, while a cause of action clearly ac-
crues to the owner of real property in possession thereof
whenever a cloud upon his title is created, the cause of action
is a continuing one and is available as long as the cloud re-
mains. They adopt the view of the New York Court in
Miner v. Beekinail, 50 N. Y. 337, that the cause of action is
not the creation of the cloud, but its existence.
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In Dewing v. Woods, III Fed. 575, the Circuit Court of
Appeals, Fourth Circuit, decided that the claimant of land,
Title of which' has been sold for back, taxes and pur-
Plaintif chased by the State, cannot maintain a bill to
remove the cloud upon his title. In this, the.'court follows
Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552, where it was held that the
holder of an equitable title, not in possession, could not
maintain a bill. Here the question of possession is not dis-
cussed-the court stating it was immaterial as the plaintiff
did not have the legal title.
RAILROADS.
A was working, in the employ of the B. Co., upon the
premises of the C. R. R. Co. The latter allowed A. and his
Employee of fellow-workmen to use a hand-car in going and
Third Party, comiig from -their work. The hand-car was
Injury run down through the negligence of Co.'s ser-
vants. The defendant demurred and his demurrer was sus-
tained in the lower court, but in Reynolds v. Mink, I I I Fed.
R. 692, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court.
The A. Railroad Company had allowed the employes of
a pottery company to use a path along the track. The plain-
Use of tiff testified that he -was an employe and was
Footpath, on his way to the station to meet a friend, com-
.cense ing in on a train, when he was hit by a flying
brake-shoe and injured. In R. R. v. Martin, I I I Fed. 586,
Dallas, J., held that the plaintiff was at best a licensee, and
could not recover for an injury of this nature. Cf. Gillis v.
R. R., 59 Pa. 143.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
A.'s creditor B. desired additional security, and C. became
such surety in consideration of the promise of A.'s father,
Promise o D., to reimburse him if he were compelled to
Indemnify pay. The New Jersey Court of Errors and
Surety Appeals, in.Hartley v. 'Sandford, 50 Atl. R.
454, decided, that the father could not be held upon his parol
promise-the case coming within the Statute of Frauds.
They distinguish the case where the promisor is also a signer
of the bond (Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728), and
where there is a hew consideration beneficial to the promisor
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(Tigh v. M4orrison, i16 N. Y. 263) but say there is good
authority for holding that an undertaking to indemnify a
person for becoming. surety for another is, in the absence of
any modifying fact, a promise within the statute. (Green v.
Creswell, io Adol. & E.. 453.)
TAX TITLE.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has decided that,
where a person is possessed of a term of years in a property
Rights In under a tax sale, he has no right to fell timber.
Land Brewer v. Ireland, 50 Atl. 437.
TRUSTS.
By § 4706, Kentucky Statutes, a trustee may not invest in
the bonds of any railroad which has not been in operation for
Investments at least ten years. In the case of Aydelott v.
Breeding, 64 S. W. 916, the trustee had entered
upon his duties as trustee before the statute was enacted,
and the question was whether, since he had acted as a pru-
dent business man, he should be held for the loss occasioned
by an investment made contrary to the statute. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals held him accountable.
In the case of Elizalde v. Graves, 66 Pac. 368, the ques-
tion before the Supreme Court of California was whether
Identification an administrator can be held a trustee where he
of Funds receives funds that the intestate had held as
trustee but had mingled with his own funds. The court
cites Lewin 875 and arrives at the decision that so long as the
amount in the fund is greater than the amount of the trust-
fund it will, in the absence of any showing to the contrary,
be presumed to be that held in trust.
WILLS.
The testator, in Canield v. Canield, 50 Atl. R. 471, had
directed that his land be sold, after the death of his wife,
Conversion and the money divided among the residuary
of Real into legatees. One of the legatees having-died before
Personal the testator, the question was whether this share
Estate should be treated as personalty or realty.. The
New Jersey Court of Chancery held that as the purpose of
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the conversion from realty into personalty had failed, they
would treat the share as realty. This decision is based upon
the case of Ackroyd v. Smithson, i White & T. Lead. Cas.
Eq. 690.
In Glascott v. Bragg, 87 N. W. 853, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin had presented to it the question whether a
Revo"tion man's previous will was revoked by the adoption
by Adoption of a child. The father had taken out a life
of Child insurance policy in the son's favor and this had
been paid. The court, however, stating that the law was settled
that the birth of a child was not only evidence of revoca-
tion, but was a revocation, concerned itself with the question
whether an adopted child came under the same rule; and,
as the Wisconsin statute says they shall have all the legal
rights of a natural. child, except the right to take property
expressly limited to the heirs of the body, they must be
regarded as natural children as to the revocation of wills.
The decision is in accord with Hilpire v. Claude, 1O9 Ia.
159.
The Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds in American
Bible Society v. American Tract Society, 50 Atl. 67, that a
Designatl o devise to an unincorporated charitable society,,of without further specification of purpose, is not
Charitable Use void under the statute of frauds, because not
complying with the requirement that all declarations and
creations of trust or confidence shall be manifested in the
will, since the by-laws of the society, expressing its objects
and purposes, are themselves a sufficient designation of the
conditions and purposes of the devise. This would consti-
tute, apparently, an incorporation by implied reference.
